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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have recently
achieved state-of-the-art performance and provide significant
progress in many machine learning tasks, such as image clas-
sification, speech processing, natural language processing, etc.
However, recent studies have shown that DNNs are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. For instance, in the image classification
domain, adding small imperceptible perturbations to the input
image is sufficient to fool the DNN and to cause misclassification.
The perturbed image, called adversarial example, should be
visually as close as possible to the original image. However, all
the works proposed in the literature for generating adversarial
examples have used the Lp norms (L0, L2 and L∞) as distance
metrics to quantify the similarity between the original image
and the adversarial example. Nonetheless, the Lp norms do not
correlate with human judgment, making them not suitable to
reliably assess the perceptual similarity/fidelity of adversarial
examples. In this paper, we present a database for visual fidelity
assessment of adversarial examples. We describe the creation of
the database and evaluate the performance of fifteen state-of-
the-art full-reference (FR) image fidelity assessment metrics that
could substitute Lp norms. The database as well as subjective
scores are publicly available to help designing new metrics for
adversarial examples and to facilitate future research works.1
Index Terms—deep neural network, adversarial attack, adver-
sarial example, subjective evaluation, perturbation
I. INTRODUCTION
One can only be impressed by the deep neural networks
(DNNs) performance that are significantly superior to those
achieved using conventional shallower networks. Taking ad-
vantage of the proliferation of large datasets in addition
to the increase in computational power, the DNNs have
shown a high efficiency in various difficult tasks such image
classification [1], object detection [2], speech recognition [3]
and natural language processing [4]. For instance, in the
field of image recognition, the DNNs are able to recognize
images with almost human precision, allowing them to be
used in different sensitive applications such as autonomous
cars, biometric, video surveillance, etc.
Despite state-of-the-art performance achieved by DNNs,
it has been shown that they are vulnerable and unstable to
adversarial attacks [5]. For instance, in the field of image
classification, Szegedy et al. [6] was the first to show that small
and almost imperceptible perturbations added to test images
could lead DNN to misclassifying them. The perturbed images
are called adversarial examples.
1https://github.com/safezza/IQA-CNN-Adversarial-Attacks
Fig. 1. Applying small imperceptible perturbation to the input image fool
the deep neural network classifier. The original image is classified as an ice
bear with 85.8% confidence, while the adversarial example is classified as a
dishwasher with 100% confidence.
Goodfellow et al. [7] define adversarial examples as “inputs
to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally
designed to cause the model to make a mistake.” Figure 1
shows how an original image carefully crafted using a small
perturbation induces the network into misclassification with
high confidence. Although, to a human, the adversarial image
is indistinguishable from the original, i.e. the perturbation
is quasi-imperceptible, the classifier labels them differently.
This highlights the lack of robustness of the DNNs against
adversarial examples, which raises security issues and limits
the applications in which the neural networks can be deployed
in a real-world environment. For instance, an adversary can use
adversarial examples to manipulate the traffic signs so that the
car takes undesirable and inappropriate actions, which is sig-
nificantly dangerous. Therefore, it is of paramount importance
to understand how and why these vulnerabilities to attacks
occurs, thereby increasing the robustness of DNNs against
the adversarial examples and bridging the gap between human
perception and DNN-based systems.
Recently, great efforts have been made to propose methods
for generating adversarial examples, which have been used as a
benchmark for evaluating the robustness of candidate defenses.
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Several adversarial attacks strategies have been proposed in
the literature, and they are primarily differentiated by their
computational cost, the level of knowledge about the attacked
model and the purpose of the attacker [8]–[10].
As a general rule, two factors of adversarial examples, in the
domain of image classification, should be considered [8]–[10]:
1) Fooling the image classifier: the adversarial example
is crafted by adding small perturbation to the original
image in such a way to cause classification mistake, i.e.,
the perturbed image is misclassified to a specific class
(targeted attack) or only misclassified to an arbitrary
class (untargeted attack).
2) Imperceptible perturbation: the introduced perturbation
should be undetectable by human observer. The original
image and its intentionally perturbed version (adversarial
example) are expected to be visually very close, and the
differences between them are hardly noticeable by the
human eye.
For the second aspect, which is the focus of our study, all
the works proposed in the literature for generating adversarial
examples have used the Lp norms (L0, L2 and L∞) as
distance metrics to quantify the similarity between the original
image and the adversarial example [9], [10]. However, the
Lp norms do not correlate with human judgment, because
they are pixel-based error measures and do not take into
account the properties of human visual system (HVS) [11].
Despite these common measures provide poor performance for
assessing perceptual similarity/fidelity, all existing works have
adopted these metrics as perturbation measures for generating
adversarial examples.
On the other hand, in the last decade, considerable research
efforts have been made to develop objective quality/fidelity
assessment metrics [12]–[14]. The purpose of this research is
to develop tools allowing to evaluate the quality/fidelity in a
way that is consistent with human judgments [14]. There is a
tendency to confuse image quality metrics with image fidelity
metrics, despite the fact that they are closely linked, the two
families of metrics have different purposes. The former are
designed to predict subjective human appreciation upon the
quality of multimedia content, while the latter refer to the
ability to quantify the visual differences between a reference
and test image [15]. Given the purpose of this work, image
fidelity assessment (IFA) metrics are more appropriate for the
generation and performance analysis of adversarial examples.
That is why in the rest of this paper, we refer to image fidelity
metrics instead image quality metrics.
However, the use of an inappropriate IFA metric can lead
to wrong conclusions and suboptimal results, which can be
the case with Lp norms that exhibit poor correlation with the
human perception. There is therefore an urgent need to find
a more accurate IFA metric that could substitute Lp norms
for generating and assessing adversarial examples in close
agreement with human similarity judgments.
The natural way to reach this goal is to take advantage of the
many IFA metrics proposed in the literature. However, these
metrics were typically developed for some specific applica-
tions, and consequently were designed to capture distortions
that are related to these applications, such as blur and blocking
for compression, noise for acquisition and fast fading for
wireless transmission, to cite a few examples. Nevertheless,
the adversarial perturbations/distortions used against DNNs
can have different properties than those widely tackled by
the quality/fidelity assessment community. Thus, developing
new reliable IFA metrics specifically for adversarial examples
represents a new research challenges to this community.
In this paper, we present a database for visual fidelity assess-
ment of adversarial examples. To the best of our knowledge,
this database is the first one specifically dedicated to the per-
ceptual assessment of adversarial perturbations against DNNs
and is publicly available to facilitate future research works.
The dataset includes 360 images that have been generated
using six prominent adversarial attacks with different levels of
perturbations. The subjective data of eighteen human subjects
have been collected, where each subject was asked to rate the
fidelity of the adversarial example with respect to the reference
image. The resulting MOS scores have been used to evaluate
the performance of the three distance metrics (L0, L2 and
L∞) and to assess the performance of fifteen state-of-the-
art full-reference (FR) image fidelity assessment metrics, as
well as can be used to design new IFA metrics for adversarial
examples.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides the taxonomy of adversarial attacks. Section III
describes the performed subjective experiment, including the
preparation of the test material, environmental setup and the
test methodology. Next, the results and analysis of objective
metrics are provided in Section IV. Finally, Section V con-
cludes the paper.
II. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON DEEP NEURAL
NETWORKS
An adversarial example is an original image carefully-
crafted by an adversary attack with the aim to fool DNN
classifier. The adversary attacks can be divided into two
categories: white-box attacks that have a full access to the
architecture and models parameters of the DNN, and those
who only have access to the output of the attacked model
(label or confidence score), known as black-box attacks. In
addition, according to the objective to be reached, adversary
attacks can also be distinguished as targeted and untargeted
attacks. Formally, given an original input image x and a trained
classifier C, generating an adversarial example x′ can be
formulated as a constrained optimization problem [9]:
x′ = argmin
x′
D(x, x′),
s.t. C(x) = l,
C(x′) = l′, (1)
l 6= l,′
where D denotes a distance metric between two data sample,
while l and l′ denote the output class label of x and x′,
TABLE I
SELECTED ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS PARAMETERS WITH THEIR
CORRESPONDING VALUES.
Adversarial attack Parameter Values
FGSM [5]  0.002, 0.03, 0.06, 0.14, 0.4
BIM [16]  0.003, 0.03, 0.06, 0.15, 3
Deepfool [17] overshoot 0.25, 1.0, 3.5, 36, 500
C&W [10] (confidence,learning rate)
(10, 0.4), (10, 1),
(30, 0.9), (30, 1.3), (70, 0.9)
PGD [19]  0.003, 0.03, 0.1, 0.4, 1.40
MIM [18]  0.005, 0.03, 0.06, 0.19, 0.6
respectively. In the case of a target attack, l′ is specified by
the attacker, while for an untargeted attack, l′ can be any class
label, as long as it is different from the correct label l.
The distance metric D is used to quantify similarity/fidelity
between the adversarial example and the original image. In
the literature, three metrics are commonly used for generating
adversarial examples, and all three are Lp norms [10]. In other
words, the amount of perturbation is quantified by Lp norms,
i.e., ‖x− x′‖p, where the p-norm is defined as
‖v‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
|vi|p
) 1
p
(2)
Specifically, L0, L2 and L∞ are the three widely used metrics:
1) L0 metric counts the number of pixels that have been
altered in the adversarial example.
2) L2 metric measures the Euclidean distance between the
adversarial example and the original image.
3) L∞ metric denotes the largest absolute difference value
among all pixels in the adversarial example.
Nevertheless, these metrics do not correlate with human
perception, because, they totally overlook spatial relationships
between image pixels, and also consider that all changes in
the visual signal are of equal importance. Finally, they do not
take into account any of the perceptual properties of the HVS.
Several methods have been proposed in the literature to
generate adversarial examples, they differ mainly in the mod-
eling of objective function that seeks the best solution to the
optimization problem described above in (1). The perturbation
is determined by maximizing the classification error, while
minimizing distance metric.
In our subjective study, we considered six prominent attacks
that are: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [5], Basic
Iterative Method (BIM) [16], Deepfool [17], Carlini-Wagner
(C&W) attack [10], Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [19]
and Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) [18]. All these at-
tacks are gradient-based adversarial generating approaches [9].
Specifically, the input image is perturbed according to the
gradient of the loss function of the attacked DNN, where the
perturbation magnitude gradually increases until the image is
misclassified. For a complete description of these attacks, the
reader is refereed to their original papers.
(a) Small impairment (b) Medium impairment (c) High impairment
Fig. 2. Adversarial examples with different levels of impairment generated
using BIM (top) and C&W (bottom) attacks.
III. SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION
In this section, the conducted subjective study of adversarial
examples is presented. Our goal is to use the ground truth
obtained from human judgments to check the suitability of
several state-of-the-art image fidelity assessment (IFA) metrics
for adversarial examples, which can constitute viable alterna-
tives to the three widely used distance metrics (L0, L2 and
L∞).
A. Adversarial Attacks Description
As mentioned previously, a total of six adversarial attacks
have been employed to generate the adversarial examples.
All these attacks have been implemented using Cleverhans
software library [20], which provides standardized reference
implementations of adversarial example generation techniques.
Each attack can be tuned through a set of parameters, here,
we are only focused on the ones controlling the magnitude
of the perturbation introduced. Table I lists the parameters
used to generate the different adversarial examples. The
parameters values have been carefully chosen in a way to
generate adversarial examples with a broad range of pertur-
bations/distortions, thus covering the full range of subjective
impairment scale, from imperceptible levels to high levels
of impairment. Figure 2 shows some samples of adversarial
images, in addition, the histogram of subjective scores for the
entire dataset is illustrated in Figure 4.
As a victim DNN model, we used the well-known
Inception v3 network [21], because it is pre-trained on Im-
ageNet dataset [22] that we considered as a source image,
as reported in Section III-B. Thus, the gradient of its loss
function is exploited by the different attacks to compute the
perturbation introduced to the original input image.
B. Dataset Preparation
Since our work deals with adversarial examples for DNN-
based image classification, we focused our subjective exper-
Fig. 3. SI and CF distributions of the selected contents.
iment on the most widely used image classification dataset,
which is ImageNet database [22]. Twelve images have been
selected from the database that represent different content,
including indoor and outdoor scenes and a wide range of colors
and textures. In order to cover a wide range of features, the
spatial complexity and color features of each image have been
analyzed using Spatial Information (SI) [23] and ColorFulness
(CF) [24], respectively. The Figure 3 shows the values of SI
and CF for all the selected images.
The original images have different sizes, that we cropped
to the size of 299 × 299 pixels covering the main object in
the image. Because, given that we used Inception v3 network
as attacked DNN, and the latter has an image input size of
299×299. Consequently, to avoid the up- and down- sampling
operations that can introduce distortions to the input image,
we made choice to crop the images to the input size of the
Inception v3 network.
Thus, the twelve selected and cropped images were used
to produce the subjective test dataset. Each image was per-
turbed/attacked using the six different adversarial attacks with
the five different parameter settings, thus providing 360 adver-
sarial examples. In addition, two other different images have
been selected for training.
C. Environment Setup and Test Methodology
The subjective evaluations were conducted in a laboratory
psychovisual test room, calibrated according to ITU-R BT.500-
13 Recommendations [25], equipped with a controlled lighting
system and the color of the all background walls and curtains
is mid-gray. A full HD 27-inch Dell UltraSharp U2717D was
used to display the test stimuli. The distance of the subjects
from the monitor was approximately equal to 7 times the
picture height, as recommended in [26].
Since the detection of impairment is an important factor
in our study, the subjective experiments have been con-
ducted using the Double Stimulus Impairment Scale (DSIS)
method [25]. Both the original image and adversarial example
were displayed in a side-by-side arrangement on the same
monitor. The original image and adversarial example were
always displayed on the left and right side, respectively, and
the subjects were aware of these positions.
At the end of the presentation of each pair of images, a
dedicated user interface was displayed on the screen for about
five seconds during which the subject gives its judgment. The
participants were asked to rate the level of impairment of
the adversarial examples with respect to the reference original
image, using a five-grade discrete impairment scale (1: very
annoying, 2: annoying, 3: slightly annoying, 4: perceptible, but
not annoying, 5: imperceptible). In other words, the observers
tried to quantity the visibility degree of the perturbation
introduced by the attack.
Given the large number of stimuli, making impossible to
show all of them in a single session, because the viewing
session would exceed 30 minutes. Consequently, in order to
avoid visual fatigue effects, the subjective experiment was
divided into three sessions whose duration does not exceed
20 minutes each. Subjects took a break between each two
sessions. Moreover, each test session involved only one subject
assessing the stimuli. In order to avoid possible contextual
and memory effects, the display order of these stimuli was
randomized in a way that the same content was never shown
consecutively.
Before the experiment starts, instructions explaining the task
were provided to subjects. In addition, training session was
held with additional images, allowing the subjects to practice
and become familiarize with the test procedure. The quality
of these training samples was chosen so that it covers the full
rating scale.
A total of 18 naive subjects (5 females and 13 males) took
part in the subjective experiment. The age of subjects was
ranging from 21 to 54, with an average of 28.8. All subjects
were screened for color blindness and visual acuity using
Ishihara and Snellen charts, respectively.
D. Data Processing
First, the subjective scores were processed to detect and
exclude possible outliers, i.e., subjects whose scores deviated
strongly from others. Outliers detection was performed as
specified in [25], and no outlier subjects were detected in this
study.
Second, the Mean Opinion Score (MOS) was computed
as the mean across scores provided by different subjects as
follows:
MOSj =
1
N
N∑
i=1
sij (3)
where N is the number of subjects and sij is the score given
by subject i for the stimulus j.
In order to evaluate the reliability of the obtained results
from statistical point of view, 95% confidence intervals (CI),
assuming a Students t-distribution of the scores, were com-
puted together with MOS values.
IV. OBJECTIVE EVALUATION AND RESULTS ANALYSIS
It is highly desirable that the obtained MOS scores show
fair distribution of values and are representative of the dif-
Fig. 4. Histogram of the MOS scores in the database.
ferent impairment level on the rating scale. Figure 4 shows
MOS values distribution on the whole database. Overall, we
obtained an almost a fair distribution, except for the 4.5-5
scale for which we obtained higher frequency. This mainly
due to Deepfool attack, which impairment level is hardly
to adjust and often provides undetectable perturbations. In
addition, Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of MOS values
for each assessed image. Thus, the resulting MOS values
uniformly span the whole impairment scale, which means that
the subjective experiments have been properly designed and
conducted.
The results of the subjective tests were used as ground truth
to evaluate fifteen full reference (FR) objective fidelity/quality
metrics, namely: Peak-Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (PSNR), Struc-
tural Similarity Index (SSIM) [27], Feature Similarity Index
(FSIM/FSIMc for color images) [28], Visual Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (VSNR) [29], Gradient Similarity Measure (GSIM) [30],
Most Apparent Distortion (MAD) [31], Multi-Scale SSIM in-
dex (MS-SSIM) [32], Visual Saliency-based Index (VSI) [33],
Visual Information Fidelity (VIF/VIFp for pixel domain) [34],
Information Fidelity Criterion (IFC) [35], Weighted Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (WSNR), Universal Quality Index (UQI) [36],
Noise Quality Measure (NQM) [37].
In addition, the three widely used distance metrics (L0, L2
and L∞) have been also considered for evaluation and are
compared against the fifteen objective fidelity metrics.
The performance evaluation of the set of metrics has been
carried out in terms of three attributes: accuracy, monotonicity,
and consistency, with respect to subjective scores. To achieve
this goal, four performance measures were used, namely
Pearson Linear Correlation Coefficient (PLCC) and Root Mean
Square Error (RMSE) for prediction accuracy, while Spearman
Rank Order Correlation Coefficient (SROCC) and Outlier
Ratio (OR) for monotonicity and consistency, respectively. We
can say that a metric obtains good performance, if the values
of PLCC and SROCC are high (close to ±1), and the values
of RMSE and OR is low (close to 0).
PLCC measure was computed between the MOS and the
objective score (Qp) provided by the metric after a non-linear
Fig. 5. The distribution of MOS values for each image.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF OBJECTIVE FIDELITY/QUALITY METRICS
AND Lp NORMS DISTANCE METRICS.
Method PLCC SROCC RMSE OR
SSIM 0.936 0.939 0.416 0.152
MS-SSIM 0.858 0.942 0.677 0.152
VSI 0.876 0.955 0.634 0.138
VIF 0.925 0.932 0.500 0.172
VIFp 0.913 0.925 0.536 0.172
MAD 0.977 0.973 0.275 0.119
WSNR 0.941 0.936 0.445 0.158
FSIM 0.891 0.943 0.598 0.166
FSIMc 0.900 0.944 0.574 0.163
PSNR 0.962 0.958 0.357 0.138
UQI 0.901 0.907 0.571 0.186
IFC 0.922 0.914 0.509 0.166
NQM 0.942 0.936 0.441 0.172
GSIM 0.835 0.954 0.725 0.147
VSNR 0.923 0.917 0.507 0.186
L0 0.885 0.915 0.613 0.186
L2 0.914 0.958 0.533 0.138
L∞ 0.517 0.645 1.12 0.336
regression. This regression is performed using a 5-parameter
logistic function as recommended in [14] and defined as
follows:
Qp(x) = β1(
1
2
− 1
1 + expβ2(x−β3)
) + β4x+ β5 (4)
where βi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) are five free-parameters to be
fitted based on the Gauss-Newton method.
The PLCC, SROCC, RMSE and OR results are provided in
Table II, where the top performing metric is given in boldface.
Overall, a little more than half of the evaluated FR objective
metrics provide good performance, especially MAD metric
that shows the highest correlation with subjective scores.
As expected, the Lp distance metrics provide poor per-
formance, except the L2 distance that can be considered as
acceptable, but still below those provided by the FR objective
metrics. For instance, L∞ distance has obtained the worst
results compared to all evaluated metrics.
According to the reporting results, most of the FR objective
metrics provide better performance than the widely used Lp
distance metrics. Thanks to the inclusion of HVS features,
the evaluated objective metrics correlate well with subjective
scores and represent an obvious alternative to the Lp distance
metrics. Consequently, the adoption and inclusion of FR
objective metrics in the construction of adversarial attacks can
produce more optimal results, thus allowing to contribute in
developing more robust deep neural networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we focused on the visual fidelity assessment of
adversarial examples. We presented a publicly available dataset
of adversarial examples, which can be used to the design and
evaluation of new objective IFA metrics specifically developed
for this kind of impairment. The dataset was constructed
through subjective experiment, where the original images
as well as adversarial examples, along with objective and
subjective scores are provided.
The test results clearly exhibited that the Lp norms are non-
suitable to quantify the perceived perturbations of adversarial
examples, and that the objective fidelity/quality metrics repre-
sent a solid alternative to be a substitute for Lp norms.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “Imagenet classification
with deep convolutional neural networks,” in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems (NIPS), Nevada, USA, Dec. 2012, pp. 1097–1105.
[2] S. Ren, K. He, R. Girshick, and J. Sun, “Faster R-CNN: towards real-
time object detection with region proposal networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 1137–
1149, Jun. 2017.
[3] G. Hinton, et al., “Deep neural networks for acoustic modeling in speech
recognition: The shared views of four research groups,” IEEE Signal
processing magazine, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 82–97, Nov. 2012.
[4] I. Sutskever, O. Vinyals, and Q. V. Le, “Sequence to sequence learning
with neural networks,” in Advances in neural information processing
systems (NIPS), pp. 3104–3112, Montral, Canada, Dec. 2014.
[5] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” in International Conference on Learning Repre-
sentations (ICLR), San Diego, CA, May. 2015.
[6] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow
and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,” in Inter-
national Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), Scottsdale,
Arizona, USA, May. 2013.
[7] I. J. Goodfellow, N. Papernot, S. Huang, Y. Duan and P.
Abbeel, “Attacking Machine Learning with Adversarial Examples,”
https://blog.openai.com/adversarial-example-research/. Open AI Blog.
2017.
[8] N. Akhtar and A. Mian, “Threat of Adversarial Attacks on Deep
Learning in Computer Vision: A Survey,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, 14410–
14430, Feb. 2018.
[9] X. Yuan, . He, Q. Zhu, X. Li, “Adversarial Examples: Attacks and
Defenses for Deep Learning,” IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks
and Learning Systems, 2019.
[10] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), San
Jose, CA, USA, May. 2017.
[11] Z. Wang and A.C. Bovik, “Mean squared error: love it or leave it? a new
look at signal fidelity measures,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol.
26, no. 1, pp. 98–117, 2009.
[12] S. Winkler and P. Mohandas, “The evolution of video quality measure-
ment: from PSNR to hybrid metrics,” IEEE Trans. Broadcast., vol .54,
no. 3, pp. 660–668, Jun. 2008.
[13] S. Chikkerur, V. Sundaram, M. Reisslein and L. J. Karam, “Objective
video quality assessment methods: A classification, review, and perfor-
mance comparison,” IEEE Trans. Broadcast., vol .25, no. 2, pp. 165–182,
Jun. 2011.
[14] H. R. Sheikh, M. F. Sabir and A. C. Bovik, “A statistical evaluation
of recent full reference image quality assessment algorithms,” IEEE
Transactions on image processing, vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 3440–3451, Nov.
2006.
[15] D.A. Silverstein and J.E. Farrell, “The relationship between image
fidelity and image quality,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on
Image Processing (ICIP), Lausanne, Switzerland, Sep. 1996.
[16] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial examples in the
physical world,” in Workshop Track of the International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), Toulon, France, Apr. 2017.
[17] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Deepfool: a simple
and accurate method to fool deep neural networks,” in IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2016.
[18] Y. Dong, F. Liao, T. Pang, H. Su, J. Zhu, X. Hu and J. Li, “Boosting
Adversarial Attacks with Momentum,” in IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), Salt Lake City, USA, Jun. 2018.
[19] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras and A. Vladu, “Towards
Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), Vancouver, BC,
Canada, 2018.
[20] N. Papernot et al., “cleverhans v2.1.0: Adversarial Examples Library,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768, 2018.
[21] C. Szegedy, V. Vanhoucke, S. Ioffe, J. Shlens and Z. Wojna, “Rethinking
the Inception Architecture for Computer Vision,” in IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), Las Vegas, NV,
2016, pp. 2818–2826.
[22] O. Russakovsky et al., “ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge,” International Journal of Computer Vision (IJCV), vol. 115,
no. 3, pp. 211–252, 2015.
[23] ITU-T P.910, “Subjective video quality assessment methods for multi-
media applications,” International Telecommunication Union, Apr. 2008.
[24] D. Hasler and S. E. Suesstrunk, “Measuring colorfulness in natural
images,” Human vision and electronic imaging VIII, Jun. 2003.
[25] ITU-R BT.500-13, “Methodology for the subjective assessment of the
quality of television pictures,” International Telecommunication Union,
Jan. 2012.
[26] ITU-R BT.2022, “General viewing conditions for subjective assessment
of quality of SDTV and HDTV television pictures on flat panel displays,”
International Telecommunication Union, Aug. 2012.
[27] Z. Wang, A. C. Bovik, H. R. Sheikh, and E. P. Simoncelli, “Image
quality assessment: From error visibility to structural similarity,” IEEE
Trans. Image Process., vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 600-612, Apr. 2004.
[28] L. Zhang, L. Zhang, X. Mou, and D . Zhang, “FSIM: A feature similarity
index for image quality assessment,” IEEE Trans. Image Process., vol.
20, no. 8, pp. 2378–2386, Aug. 2011.
[29] D. M. Chandler and S. S. Hemami, “VSNR: A wavelet-based visual
signal-to-noise ratio for natural images,” IEEE Trans. Image Process.,
vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 2284–2298, Sep. 2007.
[30] A. Liu, W. Lin, and M. Narwaria, “Image Quality Assessment Based
on Gradient Similarity,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol.
21, no. 4, pp. 1500–1512, 2012.
[31] E. C. Larson and D. M. Chandler , “Most apparent distortion: Full-
reference image quality assessment and the role of strategy,” J. Electron.
Imag., vol. 19, no. 1, 2010.
[32] Z. Wang, E. P. Simoncelli, A. C. Bovik, “Multi-scale structural similarity
for image quality assessment,” in IEEE Asilomar Conference on Signals,
Systems, and Computers, 2003, pp. 1398–1402.
[33] L. Zhang, Y. Shen, and H. Li, “VSI: A Visual Saliency-Induced Index
for Perceptual Image Quality Assessment,” IEEE Transactions on Image
Processing, vol. 23, no. 10, Oct. 2014.
[34] H. R. Sheikh and A. C. Bovik, “Image information and visual quality,”
IEEE Trans. Image Process., vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 430–444, Feb. 2006
[35] H.R. Sheikh, A.C. Bovik and G. de Veciana, “An information fidelity
criterion for image quality assessment using natural scene statistics,”
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 14, no. 12, pp. 2117–
2128, Dec. 2005.
[36] Z. Wang and A. C. Bovik, “A universal image quality index,” IEEE
signal processing letters, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 81–84, 2002.
[37] N. Damera-Venkata, T.D. Kite, W.S. Geisler, B.L. Evans, and A.C.
Bovik, “Image quality assessment based on degradation model,” IEEE
Trans. on Image Processing, vol. 9, no. 4, pp.636–650, 2000.
